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BACHELOR PARTIES BEWARE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT GRAPPLES
WITH ALCOHOL, STRIP CLUBS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
MORALITY LEGISLATION
"The Constitution does not prevent those communities that wish
to do so from regulating, or indeed entirely suppressing, the bus-
iness of pandering sex."
- Justice Antonin Scalia1
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND EROTIC EXPRESSION
The First Amendment, by its own terms, limits its protections to
"speech" and makes no explicit textual reference to expression or con-
duct.2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated, on numerous occa-
sions, that nude dancing is "expressive conduct" and is therefore entitled
to some First Amendment protection. 3 Not surprisingly, this controversial
and somewhat fragile stance is the source of intense debate, pitting the
fundamental protections and freedoms guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment against the reasonable desire for "societal order and morality."
4
Consequently, within this context a battle has developed between adult
1. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 443-44 (2002)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that First Amendment is not implicated by con-
duct-based regulation at issue).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. In full, the First Amendment provides: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress
of grievances." Id. (emphasis added).
3. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(acknowledging reluctantly that nude dance is "within the outer ambit of the First
Amendment's protection"); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66
(1991) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that "nude dancing... is expressive conduct
within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment"); see also Amy Adler, Girls!
Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the C-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1108, 1114
(2005) (describing Supreme Court's treatment of nude dance under First Amend-
ment as "speech, but only scarcely so"); Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Strip-
ping Away First Amendment Rights: The Legislative Assault on Sexually Oriented
Businesses, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIs. & PUB. POL'Y 287, 294 (2004) (citing Court's willing-
ness to extend First Amendment protection to some nude performances).
4. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569-70 (allowing use of morality as means of justify-
ing state action); see also Adler, supra note 3, at 1122 (admitting that "nude dancing
cases have provoked significant criticism"); Clinton P. Hansen, Note, To Strip or Not
to Strip: The Demise of Nude Dancing and Erotic Expression Through Cumulative Regula-
tions, 35 VAL. U. L. REv. 561, 573-75, 585-99 (2001) (discussing fact that state legis-
latures responded to adult entertainment industry with numerous, cumulative and
burdensome requirements).
(1095)
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entertainment clubs (strip clubs) and the cities and states in which strip
clubs operate. 5
For several reasons, state legislatures have consistently, and with a
large degree of success, regulated the activities of strip clubs through vari-
ous statutory licensing schemes. 6 After obtaining a license, a strip club
faces heavy penalties, such as a revocation of its license and fines, if it fails
to comply with the statutorily mandated standards.7 Requirements for
general licensing can include bans on total nudity, required distances be-
tween dancers and patrons, limitations on interaction between two or
more dancers, zoning regulations distancing strip clubs from schools and
residential areas, and a potential regulation forcing individual dancers to
obtain permits.8 Licensing schemes aimed at strip clubs are generallyjus-
tified as targeting "secondary effects," including crime and prostitution oc-
curring within the strip club's immediate vicinity.9 Along these same lines,
5. Compare Troy Graham, Court: Strippers' Work Not Covered, PHILADELPHIA IN-
QUIRER, July 20, 2006, at B1 (discussing recent Third Circuit opinion that New
Jersey statute regulating sex-orientated establishments was constitutional), and
Terry Kemple, Voters Gave Clear Mandate to Regulate Sex Businesses, TAMPA TRIB., Jan.
6, 2007, at 15 (detailing devastating impact sex-oriented business has in commu-
nity), with Shannon P. Duffy, Risque Move Pays Off: Topless Bar Topples Lewdness Law,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 16, 2006, at 1 (announcing Third Circuit's decision to
strike down Pennsylvania lewdness statute, which had placed restrictions on strip
club industry), and Dan Margolies, Nudity Law Is Struck Down, KAN. CITY STAR, Dec.
20, 2006, at C1 (reporting that adult entertainment industry tallied victory when
Missouri Supreme Court struck down law placing restrictions on strip clubs).
6. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:2-23.6(a) (1) (2005) (using statutory scheme to
regulate lewd and immoral activity on liquor licensed premises); PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 4-493(10) (2006) (regulating strip clubs through liquor licensing statute); see also
Calvert & Richards, supra note 3, at 290 (acknowledging paradox wherein strip
clubs are becoming more popular and profitable while local municipalities
"tighte[n]" laws regulating sex industry); Hansen, supra note 4, at 585-99 (noting
that regulations have expanded from simple alcohol restrictions "to include re-
straining hours of operation, requiring minimum distance between patrons and
dancers, and eliminating all contact between dancers and patrons").
7. See, e.g., Mo. R~v. STAT. § 311.710(1) (2006) (listing suspension and revoca-
tion of license as potential penalty and establishing jurisdiction over hearings re-
lated thereto); PA. CONS. STAT. § 4-493(10) (2006) (rendering violators subject to
suspension or revocation of liquor license); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-580 (2006) ("A
violation of ... this section is a ground for the revocation or suspension of the
holder's permit."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-5-107 (2006) (penalizing clubs in
breach of requirements with "a suspension or revocation of the license or other
disciplinary action"); W. VA. CODE § 60-7-12(c) (2006) (making violation of provi-
sions misdemeanor with potential penalties including jail time and fines).
8. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 3, at 292-93 (discussing arsenal of regula-
tions possessed by state legislatures); Dana M. Tucker, Preventing the Secondary Effects
of Adult Entertainment Establishments: Is Zoning the Solution?, 12J. LAND USE & ENvTL.
L. 383, 406-07 (1997) (detailing impact of zoning regulation on sex entertainment
industry).
9. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 293 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(noting that statute's aim "[iun trying to control the secondary effects of nude
dancing, [was] ... to deter crime and the other deleterious effects caused by the
presence of such an establishment in the neighborhood"); City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) ("In Seattle, as in Renton, the adult
1096
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the consumption of alcohol is often a predominant aspect of attending a
strip club.10 Accordingly, state statutory schemes often are aimed at alco-
hol distribution and consumption in strip clubs as a means of off-setting or
mitigating potential secondary effects.' '
Recently, strip club owners began fighting back, and have presented
the Third Circuit with challenges to Pennsylvania and NewJersey licensing
theater zoning ordinance was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by
the presence of even one such theater in a given neighborhood."); see also Adler,
supra note 3, at 1119 ("Under the secondary effects doctrine, speech may be regu-
lated only when it is aimed at combating effects which are not related to the mean-
ing or 'the content of the ... speech.'"). Adler goes on to discredit the secondary
effects doctrine, arguing it is illogical to believe "that the addition of pasties and a
G-string can really solve such grave problems as disease, mayhem, and violence."
Id. at 1127 (discussing secondary effects doctrine); see also Tucker, supra note 8, at
398-99 (discussing use of time, place and location restrictions on sex industry to
combat secondary effects).
10. See Marcia Yablon, The Prohibition Hangover: Why We Are Still Feeling the Ef-
fects of Prohibition, 13 VA. J. Soc. POL'v & L. 552, 572 (2006) (equating strip clubs
with old saloon). "Like the old saloon, the patrons in nude dancing clubs are al-
most exclusively male, the atmosphere is highly sexualized, excessive drinking is en-
couraged and prostitution is a frequent occurrence." Id. (emphasis added); see also
Ron Kalyan, Comment, Regulation of Nude Dancing in Bring Your Own Bottle Establish-
ments in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Are the Commonwealth's Municipalities Left
to Fend for Themselves?, 99 DICK. L. REv. 169, 172 (1994) (discussing fact that Penn-
sylvania regulates strip clubs mainly through alcohol restrictions contained in state
liquor code). See generally Tracy Swartz, State High Court Looks at Strip Club Law: City
Restricts What Dancers Can Wear When Booze Is Served, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006, at
9 (detailing state's argument that excessive alcohol consumption at erotic dance
establishments has "undesirable secondary impact" on community).
11. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 20-X-6-.11(1)-(4) (2005) (proscribing activi-
ties from occurring on licensed premises, including "bottomless dancing," and
simulation of "sexual intercourse"); ARK. CODE ANN. §3-9-306(4) (2006) (prohibit-
ing clubs with liquor license from allowing "lewd, immoral, or improper entertain-
ment"); 804 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 5:060 (2006) (prohibiting "lewd, immoral, or
obscene entertainment" from occurring on premises licensed to sell liquor); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 311.710(1) (3) (2006) (creating grounds for license removal if club
permits "any lewd, immoral, or improper entertainment"); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 13:2-23.6(a) (1) (2005) (proscribing "[a]ny lewdness or immoral activity" on li-
censed premises); PA. CONS. STAT. § 4-493(10) (2006) (restricting licensee from
allowing "dancing, theatricals or floor shows" connected with "lewd, immoral or
improper entertainment"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-580(4) (2006) (restricting clubs
with liquor license from "permit[ting] lewd, immoral, or improper entertain-
ment"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-5-107(38)(a)-(g) (2006) (listing several sexual acts
and forms of erotic expression deemed by statute to be "contrary to public welfare
and morals"); W. VA. CODE § 60-7-12(2) (2006) (making it unlawful for licensee to
permit "obscene, lewd, immoral or improper entertainment" to occur on licensed
premises).
3
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schemes.' 2 In both Conchatta Inc. v. Miller13 and 181 South Inc. v. Fischer,
14
the Third Circuit analyzed multiple constitutional challenges launched
against each of the respective state statutes. 15 To complicate the problem,
the Third Circuit was operating in an area of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence not heralded for its clarity. 16 The Third Circuit upheld the New
Jersey statute, while striking down the similarly-worded Pennsylvania stat-
ute. 17 In doing so, the Third Circuit joined several other circuit courts in
contributing to the uncertainty surrounding the proper constitutional
analysis to be applied to constitutional challenges in the sex industry
con text.18
This Casebrief will show that the Third Circuit's recent approach to
the regulation of exotic dance establishments is incomplete, in that (1) it
12. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:2-23.6(a)(1) (2005) (limiting aspects of nude
dance in premises with liquor licenses through use of language substantially
equivalent to Pennsylvania statute); PA. CONS. STAT. § 4-493(10) (2006) (prohibit-
ing clubs with liquor licenses from permitting litany of activities on premises). In
relation to erotic dance, the Pennsylvania statute reads: "It shall be unlawful ... to
permit in any licensed premises or in any place operated in connection therewith
any lewd, immoral or improper entertainment, regardless of whether a permit to provide
entertainment has been obtained or not." Id. (emphasis added).
13. 458 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Feb. 20,
2007) (No. 06-844).
14. 454 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2006).
15. Compare Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 266-68 (applying combination of Supreme
Court plurality approaches and holding Pennsylvania statute was overly broad be-
cause it regulated "mainstream" entertainment), with 181 South, 454 F.3d at 231-34
(avoiding complex constitutional analysis by finding "limiting construction" and,
accordingly, upholding New Jersey statute).
16. See Andy's Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v. City of Gary, 466 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.
2006) (admitting that "[t ] here is some confusion about which line of cases should
be used" when evaluating ordinances regulating strip clubs); Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Vill.
of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 713-15 (7th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging two lines of
Supreme Court case law, one dealing with time and place regulations and another
focusing on suppression of expressive conduct); Petition for Writ of Certiori at 14,
Miller v. Conchatta, Inc., No. 06-844 (Dec. 14, 2006), 2006 WL 3740634 ("While
the Court has addressed the regulation of nudity, nude dancing and adult en-
tertainment on several occasions, the lower courts ... are not sure how to apply
these decisions to new cases."); see also BradleyJ. Shafer & Andrea E. Adams, juris-
prudence of Doubt, 84 MICH. B.J. 22, 22 (2005) ("Perhaps no topic of law has proven
more troublesome for members of the Supreme Court to reach a consensus as that
of the jurisprudence dealing with sex."). See generally Adler, supra note 3, at 1121-
22 (discussing Supreme Court's inconsistent and non-binding analyses in nude
dance regulation context).
17. SeeJason Cato, Court Strips State of Nude Dance Ban, Prrr. TRIB. REv., Aug.
19, 2006, at BI (discussing recent Third Circuit decisions and impact on strip clubs
in respective states); Carrie Weimer, Free Speech or Scantily Clad Lewd Behavior?, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at IA (noting that one commentator stated "I
can't answer why there was a different decision made by the same judges . . . [in]
cases with identical facts .... " For a further discussion of the divergent holdings
in Conchatta and 181 South, see infra notes 106-34 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the growing variances among the circuit courts
in approaching the regulation of sex-based businesses, see infra notes 63-105 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 52: p. 10951098
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is arguably discordant with the Supreme Court precedent and (2) it im-
practically rejects the application of an "implied narrowing construc-
tion." 19 Part II of this Casebrief discusses the Supreme Court's fractured
and contentious jurisprudential approach to sex industry regulations, and
describes the approaches other circuit courts apply when confronting sim-
ilar statutory challenges. 20 Part III focuses on the analytical structure of
the Third Circuit's recent decisions. 2 ' It also discusses suggested amend-
ments to the Pennsylvania statute and proposes a synthesized analytical
guide for practitioners who may challenge similar statutes in the future. 22
Finally, Part IV places the recent Third Circuit cases into the larger socie-
tal context-the battle over whether morality legislation has its place in
current state statutory frameworks.
2 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court's Approaches to Erotic Expression Regulations
Because the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on the issue
of alcohol regulation at strip clubs, circuit courts are forced to adopt an
analytical framework by analogy.2 4 As referenced, the Supreme Court has
19. For a further discussion of why the Third Circuit's approach is arguably
incomplete, see infra notes 135-57 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the varying approaches the Supreme Court has
adopted, see infra notes 24-62 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how the
other circuit courts have disposed of similar statutory challenges, see infra notes 63-
105 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's holdings in Conchatta and
181 South, see infra notes 106-34 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the likely amendments to the Pennsylvania stat-
ute struck down in Conchatta, and a synthesized analytical approach to adopt when
challenging the amended statute, see infra notes 135-57 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the recent Third Circuit opinions within a
larger societal context, see infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
24. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (hold-
ing that Twenty-first Amendment did notjustify abridging First Amendment right
to free speech); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114-20 (1972) (relying on
Twenty-first Amendment to justify state regulation of nightclub). In LaRue, the
court was presented with the precise issue that the Third Circuit was presented
with in Conchatta and 181 South. See LaRue, 409 U.S. at 111-12 (reciting alcohol
regulations). The Department of Alcohol Beverage Control promulgated regula-
tions restricting "topless" and "bottomless" dance clubs from engaging in certain
activities. See id. at 112 (detailing challenged ordinance). Relying on the Twenty-
first Amendment, the Court held that the regulations were constitutional. See id. at
118-19 (stating holding). Had this decision stood, the recent Third Circuit cases
could have been more easily decided. The Court, however, drastically undercut
the reasoning in LaRue when releasing its 44 Liquormart decision. See 44 Li-
quormart, 517 U.S. at 515-16 (limiting LaRue's precedential value). The Court
backed away from the Twenty-first Amendment approach taken in LaRue, reason-
ing that "the Court's analysis in LaRue would have led to precisely the same result if
it had placed no reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment." Id. (resting holding on
different reasoning than in LaRue); see also Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of Somerset, 316
F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that Court's holding in 44 Liquormart
"severely diminished" precedential value of Court's decision in LaRue); Yablon,
5
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acknowledged that the First Amendment provides some minimal protec-
tion to erotic expression. 25 The Court, however, has not taken a clear or
binding approach when evaluating the constitutionality of state and local
restrictions on nude or semi-nude dance. 2 6 Although littered with plural-
ity opinions, two lines of analysis have been fleshed out and applied by the
circuit courts.2 7 Importantly, each line of analysis implements a standard
of review less stringent than strict scrutiny, as the Court found the chal-
lenged statutes to be content-neutral. 28 The distinction between content-
based statutes and content-neutral statutes often determines the outcome
of a First Amendment challenge. 29 Content-neutral statutes are unrelated
to the suppression of expression; content-based statues involve govern-
mental interests focused on the content of expression. 30 Although the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral statutes exists, the
Court has yet to provide a clear method for discerning when a statute falls
supra note 10, at 567-68 ("[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions seem to indicate that
the Twenty-First Amendment cannot be used to regulate nude dancing, although
for decades courts had been upholding such regulations based on the power
granted to states under the Twenty-First Amendment.").
25. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(reasoning that erotic dance is protected speech). For a further discussion of the
Court's cautioned willingness to expand the First Amendment to protect erotic
dance, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
26. See Andy's Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v. City of Gary, 466 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.
2006) (admitting that there was "some confusion" about which line of Supreme
Court cases to follow when analyzing statutes similar to statute Third Circuit re-
cently confronted); see also Kevin Case, Note, "Lewd and Immoral": Nude Dancing
Sexual Expression, and the First Amendment, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1185, 1186 (2006)
(acknowledging that Supreme Court's confrontations with nude dancing cases
have "proved vexing" and recent cases have "failed to yield a majority opinion");
Lynn Mills Eckert, Language Games: Regulating Adult Establishments and the Obfusca-
tion of Gender, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUsT. 239, 242-45 (2006) (discussing convo-
luted background of Supreme Court decisions concerning sex industry
establishments).
27. See Andy's Rest., 466 F.3d at 553 (noting two lines of Supreme Court case
law floating close to, but not directly on point with issue). For a further discussion
of the two case lines, see infra notes 28-62 and accompanying text.
28. See R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech:
The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333, 335 (2006) ("Simi-
larly, 'content-based discriminations are subject to strict scrutiny because of the
weight of government behind the disparagement or suppression of some messages
. . . .I ).
29. See Wright, supra note 28, at 333-34 (noting that commentators have gone
as far as stating that "'virtually every free speech case turns on .. .the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral laws'").
30. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (stating test for determining nature of
statute).
If the governmental purpose in enacting the regulation is unrelated to
the suppression of expression, then the regulation need only satisfy the
'less stringent' standard from O'Brien for evaluating restrictions on sym-
bolic speech. If the government interest is related to the content of the
expression, however, then the regulation falls outside the scope of the
O'Brien test and must be justified under a more demanding standard.
Id. (citations omitted).
1100 [Vol. 52: p. 1095
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into these categories.3 1 Nevertheless, when a statute is deemed content-
neutral, the Court is less concerned with states infringing upon constitu-
tional rights, and is more willing to apply a less searching standard of
review. 3
2
The first line of analysis is derived from the Court's holdings in City of
Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.33 and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc.34 In these cases, the Court classified the challenged statutes as time,
place and manner restrictions aimed at combating the secondary effects of
adult entertainment. 35 By couching the discussion as such, the Court es-
tablished a lower level of requisite state justification for the statutes. 36 In
both cases, the Court confronted zoning ordinances aimed at locating
strip clubs in specific areas throughout the city.37 In Renton, the Court
outlined a three step inquiry: (1) whether the regulation was a total ban
on the activity; (2) whether the regulation was content-neutral; and (3)
whether the time, place and manner regulation "was designed to serve a
substantial governmental interest and [did] not unreasonably limit alter-
31. See Wright, supra note 28, at 334-37 (discussing distinction between con-
tent-neutral and content-based statutes). Wright further notes that "[i]n attempt-
ing to [determine the nature of the statute], courts incompatibly talk both of
focusing their inquiry on the text or face of the regulation, and of a broader judi-
cial inquiry into the legislative intent, purpose, and justification of the regulation."
Id. at 337 (detailing courts' approaches to distinguishing between content-based
and content-neutral statutes).
32. See, e.g., Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (discussing method for determining
correct standard of review); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
50 (1986) (holding that statute was content-neutral, and reasoning that appropri-
ate standard was "whether the Renton ordinance [was] designed to serve a substan-
tial governmental interest").
33. 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (plurality opinion).
34. 475 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1986) (holding that city's zoning ordinance, requiring
adult theaters to be located in specific areas, was constitutional and did not offend
First Amendment protections).
35. See Alameda, 535 U.S. at 438 ("In Renton, we specifically refused to set ... a
high bar for municipalities that want to address merely the secondary effects of
protected speech."); Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 ("In short, the Renton ordinance is
completely consistent with our definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations
...."); see also Adler, supra note 3, at 1119-21 (discussing impact of Renton's secon-
dary effects analysis on later cases, reasoning that it "paved the way" for the Court's
decision in Pap's A.M.).
36. See Alameda, 535 U.S. at 438 (acknowledging that Court was explicit in
declining to adopt high standard ofjustification for state's wanting to address sec-
ondary effects).
37. See id. at 426 (discussing facts). In Alameda, the Los Angeles Police De-
partment had conducted a study, and found that robbery and prostitution rates, as
well as other crimes, grew at a faster rate in areas with concentrated adult en-
tertainment establishments. See id. (same). As a result, the city ordinance banned
multiple adult entertainment businesses from operating in the same building. See
id. (detailing content of city ordinance). In Renton, the city council "imposed a
moratorium" on adult entertainment businesses in certain zoned areas throughout
the city. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 44-45 (explaining zoning scheme).
2007] CA SEBRdEF 1101
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native avenues of communication." 38 After analyzing the factual backdrop
to the legislation, the Court upheld the zoning ordinance, reasoning that
a "city's 'interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one
that must be accorded high respect.' "9
Likewise, the plurality in Alameda followed the holding and analysis
set forth in Renton, and placed its focus on the standard by which such
zoning regulations were to be adjudicated. 40 Even though the Court even-
tually settled on the three-prong test established in Renton, the Court was
by no means in agreement on this standard of review. 4 1 Interestingly, in
his concurrence, Justice Scalia explained that the First Amendment was
entirely inapplicable.4 2 Despite Justice Scalia's spirited concurrence and
the splintered opinion, at least one circuit has applied the Renton/Alameda
line of cases to similar statutory challenges.43
The second line of analysis, established in United States v. O'Brien44
and upheld in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,4 5 is directly applicable to regula-
38. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. (establishing "appropriate inquiry" for analyzing
challenged zoning statute).
39. Id. (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)) (detail-
ing weight given by Court to developed state interests); see also Tucker, supra note
8, at 402 (examining what municipalities should include in prospective legislation
in light of Renton line of cases). Specifically, Tucker proposes that legislation
should contain the following:
(1) a legislative record sufficient to show a nexus between adult uses and
particular secondary effects and a legislative finding that the legislation
addresses those secondary effects; (2) a definition section which is
neither vague nor overbroad; and (3) sufficient available land for the lo-
cation or relocation of adult businesses.
Id.
40. See Alameda, 535 U.S. at 438-39 (discussing impact of Renton on analysis).
Specifically, the Court reasoned that "we specifically refused to set... a high bar
for municipalities that want to address merely the secondary effects of protected
speech. We held that a municipality may rely on any evidence ... for demonstrat-
ing a connection between speech and a substantial, independent government inter-
est." Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
41. See id. at 443 (beginning concurring opinions). Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy concurred in the Court's decision. See id. at 443-53 (discussing reasons for
concurrence). Justices Souter, Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg dissented. See id. at
453-55 (announcing dissent).
42. See id. at 443-44 (concurring in Court's order); see also Case, supra note 26,
at 1194-95, 1205-06 (discussing Justice Scalia's approach and detailing fact that
Scalia does not find First Amendment to be implicated).
43. SeeAndy's Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v. City of Gary, 466 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.
2006) ("The Alameda Books/Renton line of cases deal with zoning ordinances aimed
at dispersing adult entertainment businesses throughout a community, which are
considered time, place, and manner restrictions."); see also Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiori at 19-20, Miller v. Conchatta, Inc., No. 06-844 (filed Dec. 14, 2006), 2006 WL
3740634 (discussing various lines of Supreme Court reasoning currently being ap-
plied in circuit courts).
44. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
45. 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (plurality opinion) (applying four-prong O'Brien
test to Indiana public indecency statute and holding that statute was justified "de-
spite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity").
1102 [Vol. 52: p. 1095
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tions that have the incidental effect of curtailing or suppressing some ex-
pressive conduct.4 6  Under the O'Brien standard, a governmental
suppression of expressive conduct is justified if:
(1) it is within the constitutional power of the Government; (2) it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3)
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.
4 7
In Barnes, when deciding whether a statute requiring nude dancers to
wear "pasties" and "G-strings" was constitutional, the Court, in another
fractured plurality, applied the four-prong test posited in O'Brien. 48 Al-
though the Barnes Court upheld the Indiana statute, a majority approach
was not attained.49 Justice Rehnquist rested his decision on moral
grounds, reasoning that the statute's purpose of "protecting societal order
and morality" provided a sufficient justification. 50 Again, Justice Scalia
concurred, arguing that the statute was not subject to First Amendment
scrutiny at all. 5 1 Justice Souter also concurred, and appearing to rely on
the reasoning presented in Renton, he furthered the confusion by focusing
46. See id. at 563-65 (evaluating constitutionality of case and statute proscrib-
ing public nudity); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 373-75 (confronting statute that directly
prohibited act of destroying draft card); see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S.
277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion) (discussing proper standard of review). The
decision between strict and intermediate scrutiny in this context hinges on legisla-
tive intent. If the legislature intends to suppress speech, courts are likely to apply
strict scrutiny; however, if the legislature's intent is benign, intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate (even if some speech is suppressed incidentally). For a further discus-
sion of the proper standard of review, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying
text.
47. Conchatta v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 267 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75
U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007) (No. 06-844) (citing to standard of review es-
tablished in O'Brien for content-neutral regulation); see also Tucker, supra note 8, at
395-96 (discussing and detailing four-prong approach announced in O'Brien for
non-expressive conduct).
48. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567-72 (applying O'Brien standard to statute and
holding that statute was sufficiently justified).
49. See Adler, supra note 3, at 1119 (discussing Court's inability to reach ma-
jority decision).
50. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568 (discussing history of morality legislation). In his
analysis of morality legislation, Justice Rehnquist reasoned:
Public indecency statutes of this sort are of ancient origin and presently
exist in at least 47 States. Public indecency, including nudity, was a crimi-
nal offense at common law, and this Court recognized the common-law
roots of the offense of 'gross and open indecency'. . . . Public indecency
statutes such as the one before us reflect moral disapproval of people
appearing in the nude among strangers in public places.
Id. (detailing purpose of statute).
51. See id. at 572 (concurring in Court's holding). Justice Scalia explained
that in his view, "the challenged regulation must be upheld, not because it survives
some lower level of First Amendment scrutiny, but because, as a general law regu-
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his inquiry on the state's interest in combating the secondary effects of
strip clubs.
52
Later, in City ofErie v. Pap's A.M.,53 a majority of the Court agreed that
the four-pronged O'Brien standard applied to public nudity cases; however,
the majority could not agree on whether the statute at issue furthered a
substantial state interest. 54 Importantly, the Court's focus shifted away
from the plurality opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist in Barnes.55 In-
stead of resting the decision on the importance of maintaining a level of
morality, four of the Justices placed the issue within the purview of secon-
dary effects. 5 6 After determining that the law was content-neutral, in that
it was aimed at curtailing harmful secondary effects rather than sup-
pressing expression, the Court applied the O'Brien analysis and upheld the
statute. 57 Justice Stevens was not fond of the newly created synergy be-
tween O'Brien and the secondary effects doctrine relied on in Renton.58 In
his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the O'Brien test is aimed at inciden-
tal restrictions on expression, while the secondary effects doctrine was to
lating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny at all." Id.
52. See id. at 583-84 (discussing Renton's impact on O'Brien analysis).
53. 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (plurality opinion).
54. See id. at 295-99 (discussing facts of case in context of O'Brien test). The
Court's opinion, authored by Justice O'Connor, first found that Pennsylvania was
acting within the scope of its police powers. See id. at 296 (discussing first prong of
analysis). Second, because the nude dancing that sought to be regulated was the
same as in Renton, the secondary effects argument was upheld to fulfill the second
prong of the O'Brien test. See id. at 297 (allowing secondary effects to fulfill O'Brien
prong). The Court also noted that the statute was a content-neutral statute, aimed
at regulating conduct and not expression-thereby giving the state "sufficient lee-
way" when justifying the statute. See id. at 298 (holding O'Brien test was satisfied).
55. SeeAdler, supra note 3, at 1119-21 (detailing shift in analytical approach in
Pap's A.M.). "In a break from Barnes, however, five members of the [Pap's A.M.]
Court adopted a new analysis. Employing this analysis, the four-member plurality
justified the purpose of the law banning nudity not by an appeal to morality, but by
a concern for 'secondary effects.'" Id. at 1119 (same).
56. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296 ("We conclude that Erie's asserted interest
in combating the negative secondary effects associated with adult entertainment
establishments like Kandyland is unrelated to the suppression of the erotic mes-
sage conveyed by nude dancing."); see also Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint
Neutral Zoning of Adult Entertainment Businesses, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 456-
58 (2004) (detailing emergence of secondary effects test under Renton, reasoning
that such ordinances are aimed at "limit[ing] negative secondary effects of adult
businesses, rather than suppress[ing] speech").
57. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-302 (applying O'Brien test).
58. See id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that plurality, for first
time, applied secondary effects to total suppression of expression situation). Jus-
tice Stevens explained that "[t]he present use of [the secondary effects] rationale,
however, finds no support whatsoever in our precedents. Never before have we
approved the use of that doctrine to justify a total ban on protected First Amend-
ment expression." Id. at 319 (indicting plurality's approach as lacking
foundation).
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be applied to cases involving the direct regulation of speech by targeting
its harmful secondary effects. 59
After digesting the foregoing case law, it is not surprising that circuit
courts have struggled to apply a consistent standard when addressing stat-
utes aimed at regulating nudity in the public context.60 Moreover, Su-
preme Court precedent does not necessarily speak directly to the statutes
regulating alcohol consumption that were at issue in the recent Third Cir-
cuit cases. 6 1 Accordingly, lower courts have wavered between the stan-
dards and justifications set forth in Renton and O'Brien.62
B. Confusion Abound: Circuit Courts Struggle to Find Consistency
Currently, when considering state regulation of strip clubs (and other
similar adult entertainment clubs), circuit courts are split in two re-
spects. 63 First, circuit courts have struggled with implementing a correct
and consistent analytical framework. 64 Second, circuit courts are split over
59. See id. at 326 ("But [the plurality] cannot conflate the two with the expec-
tation that Erie's interests aimed at secondary effects will be rendered unrelated to
speech by virtue of this doctrinal polyglot.").
60. See, e.g., Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Fox, 470 F.3d 1074, 1084-87 (4th Cir.
2006) (focusing more on limiting construction as opposed to Barnes or Renton anal-
ysis); Andy's Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v. Gary, 466 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 2006)
(choosing not to decide between lines, but applying Renton line of cases based on
procedural posture of case); Conchatta, Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 267-68 (3d
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007) (No. 06-844) (apply-
ing O'Brien analysis to challenged statute); Artistic Entm't, Inc. v. Warner Robins,
223 F.3d 1306, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2000) (explicitly applying O'Brien analysis to pro-
hibition on sale of alcohol at adult entertainment venues); Triplett Grille, Inc. v.
Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 134-35 (6th Cir. 1994) (relying on justice Souter's concurring
opinion in Barnes when framing analysis).
61. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (remov-
ing Twenty-first Amendment as means of justifying state regulation of adult en-
tertainment industry). For a further discussion of reasons the Court lacks a direct
stance on alcohol regulations, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
62. For a discussion of wavering views, see supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
63. For a further discussion of the circuit splits, see infra notes 64-105 and
accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Giovani Carandola, 470 F.3d at 1081-82 (citing to both Renton and
Pap's A.M. in establishing analytical framework); Andy's Rest., 466 F.3d at 553-54
(declining to choose proper standard, but nevertheless operating under Renton);
Fantasy Ranch, Inc. v. Arlington, 459 F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying
O'Brien with secondary effects test developed by Justice Souter); R.V.S., LLC v.
Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 410 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing challenged ordinance in
purview of Renton and progeny); SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 862
(8th Cir. 2003) (discussing Supreme Court case law in area and analyzing secon-
dary effects justification); Triplett Grille, 40 F.3d at 133-35 (acknowledging that
"Barnes is the law of the land" but still relying on Justice Souter's secondary effects
analysis). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's new approach, see infra
notes 106-34 and accompanying text.
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whether to accept an implied narrowing construction as a means of saving
overly broad statutory language.
65
1. Dancing Around the Correct Standard of Review
Circuit courts agree that the Supreme Court has been far from clear
in establishing proper review standards. 66 As the Tenth Circuit stated, Su-
preme Court jurisprudence in this area is littered "[with] fractured deci-
sions with no majority opinion and no clear statement of controlling
doctrine."6 7 As a result, it appears that circuit courts are either: (1) apply-
ing Renton and its progeny; or (2) applying some combination of Renton
and O'Brien in light of Justice Souter's plurality opinion in Pap's A.M.
68
The Seventh Circuit has applied the Renton line of analysis, although
the court admits that "some confusion" exists over which standard to ap-
ply.69 Specifically, the court has been unsure whether to address the stat-
ute as a time, place and manner restriction (and therefore subject to
Renton) or as a regulation of expressive conduct (thereby relegated to the
synthesized O'Brien analysis). 70 Recently, the Seventh Circuit noted that
65. Compare Odle v. Decatur County, 421 F.3d 386, 396 (6th Cir. 2005) (hold-
ing administrative practice fails as narrowing construction), and Ways v. City of
Lincoln, 274 F.3d 514, 519-20 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding implication alone cannot
cure statute's broad language), with SOB, 317 F.3d at 864-65 (accepting County
Attorney's promise as sufficient implied narrowing construction), and Baby Dolls
Topless Saloons, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 295 F.3d 471, 483 (5th Cir. 2002) (using
administrative practice as narrowing construction).
66. See, e.g., Andy's Rest., 466 F.3d at 553 (noting that "some confusion" exists
over which standard of review to follow); Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d
1182, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2003) (detailing "fractured" nature of Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in this area); Peek-a-Boo Lounge v. Manatee County, 337 F.3d 1251,
1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (indicating that no clear majority had emerged in Court's
decisions); LLEH, Inc. v. Wichita County, 289 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir. 2002) (ac-
knowledging that First Amendment protection to nude dancing exists, but admit-
ting that standard of review for such cases is not clear); Triplett Grille, 40 F.3d at 133
(declaring that choice of review was "vexing").
67. Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1184-85 (discussing applicable standard of review).
68. Compare Andy's Rest., 466 F.3d at 553-54 (applying Renton and progeny to
non-alcohol related ordinance), with SOB, 317 F.3d at 863-64 (relying on combina-
tion of Alameda and Pap's A.M. in granting locality large amount of deference
when combating secondary effects of live nude dance).
69. See Andy's Rest., 466 F.3d at 553-54 (applying Renton's secondary effects
analysis). The Seventh Circuit detailed two potential lines of Supreme Court anal-
ysis before it decided to proceed under Renton and its progeny. See id. at 553 (de-
termining which analytical framework to apply); KV.S., 361 F.3d at 407-08
(subjecting zoning ordinance to Renton and Alameda analysis); Ben's Bar, Inc. v.
Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 713 (7th Cir. 2003) ("While the O'Brien test is still
utilized by the Supreme Court in analyzing the constitutionality of public inde-
cency statutes, the Court currently evaluates adult entertainment zoning ordi-
nances as time, place, and manner regulations.") (citation omitted).
70. See Ben's Bar, 316 F.3d at 714 ("Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether
Section 5(b) should be analyzed as a time, place, and manner restriction or as a
regulation of expressive conduct under O'Brien's four-part test."). Section 5(b)
prohibited the sale of alcohol on the premises of a sexually oriented business. See
id. at 705-06 (describing challenged statute).
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under either line of cases, the "crucial analytical step" was the same-in-
termediate scrutiny was appropriate. 7 1 Further, the court expressly dis-
claimed that its choice between approaches was not to have binding effect
in the circuit.72 Nevertheless, pursuant to the most recent Seventh Circuit
decisions, the circuit currently operates under the standards set forth in
Renton when addressing statutes aimed at regulating strip clubs.
73
The second line of analysis is a synthesized standard that has its roots
in the Court's plurality opinion in Pap's A.M.7 4 As in Pap's A.M., circuits
have adopted Justice Souter's approach from Barnes, which arguably com-
bines Renton's secondary effects doctrine with the O'Brien analysis relied on
in Barnes.75 Reasoning that Justice Souter's opinion was a "common un-
derlying approach," the Sixth Circuit has adopted Justice Souter's secon-
dary effects concurrence. 76 The Eighth Circuit has also adhered to Justice
Souter's synthesized standard.77 In one case, when a strip club challenged
a public indecency ordinance, the Eighth Circuit applied the first three
prongs of the O'Brien analysis, and adopted the secondary effects doctrine
71. See Andy's Rest., 466 F.3d at 553 (discussing similarities between
approaches).
72. See id. (deciding to operate under Renton because both parties briefed the
case within Renton context).
73. See id. (applying Renton analysis to zoning statute). For a further discus-
sion of the Seventh Circuit's current approach, see supra notes 69-73 and accompa-
nying text.
74. See Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 295-96 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(conducting O'Brien analysis with emphasis on Renton's secondary effects analysis);
see also Adler, supra note 3, at 1119 ("[T]he four-member plurality [in Pap's A.M.]
justified the purpose of the law banning nudity not by an appeal to morality, [as
was the case in Barnes,] but by a concem for 'secondary effects."') (emphasis added);
Case, supra note 26, at 1201 (discussing Justice O'Connor's use of secondary effects
in conjunction with O'Brien analysis).
75. See, e.g., Conchatta, Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007) (No. 06-844) (discussing whether
statutory language satisfied Pap's A.M. standards); Fantasy Ranch, Inc. v. City of
Arlington, 459 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying synthesized approach);
SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2003) (isolating critical
inquiry, within context of O'Brien, as whether purpose justifying statute was
grounded in secondary effects); Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129,
133-35 (6th Cir. 1994) (announcing Barnes as "law of the land" but also focusing
inquiry on secondary effects doctrine).
76. See Triplett Grille, 40 F.3d at 133 (discussing Barnes and secondary effects
doctrine). The court explained that "[it] agree[d] with the district court thatJus-
tice Souter's opinion [in Barnes] may properly be regarded as providing the proper
framework for addressing the question presented here." Id. at 135. It is interest-
ing to note that in Triplett, the Seventh Circuit adopted Justice Souter's Barnes con-
currence (the secondary effects analysis) prior to the plurality of the Court
adopting it in Pap's A.M. See id. at 129 (issuing decision in 1994).
77. See SOB, 317 F.3d at 862 ("Applying these Supreme Court precedents to
this case, we can quickly isolate the critical inquiry .. . [whether] the [statute's]
purpose is to combat harmful secondary effects .... "). In making this statement,
the Eighth Circuit cites directly to the Court's plurality decision in Pap's A.M. See
id. (citing Pap's A.M.).
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as the fourth prong of the test.78 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has ac-
cepted the combined standard, citing to both Renton and Pap's A.M. 79 As
in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit focused its inquiry on
the alleged secondary effects that provided justification for the statute.8 0
Recently, the Fifth Circuit also relied on Pap's A.M. and the secondary
effects analysis, ultimately holding that the purpose behind the challenged
statute was "predominately [to target] . . . the prevention of secondary
effects." 8 1 As this Casebrief discusses, it appears that the Third Circuit has
also adopted this synthesized approach.
82
2. Extending Too Far: Saving Shakespeare from Overly Broad Statutory
Language
A judicially-created narrowing construction is a statutory interpreta-
tion by a state court or state agency that limits the reach of statutory
phrases or terms, thus allowing a federal court to avoid finding a statutory
provision to be overbroad solely because of the statutory language. 83 As
the Third Circuit has explained, "[a] narrowing construction can save an
otherwise unconstitutional statute by eliminating the statute's substantial
overbreadth."8 4 Judicially-created narrowing constructions are freely ac-
cepted by federal courts when interpreting the breadth of state statutes.
8 5
78. See id. at 862-63 (discussing whether sufficient evidence of harmful secon-
dary effects exists while conducting four-prong Barnes analysis). Interestingly, the
Eighth Circuit applied the secondary effects analysis after noting that the public
indecency ordinance was outside the scope of Renton and Alameda. See id. at 860
(noting that "[t]his case involves the second type of regulation, use of a public
indecency ordinance to totally prohibit live nude dancing").
79. See Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Fox, 470 F.3d 1074, 1082 (4th Cir. 2006)
(confronting revised statute after initially declaring statute unconstitutional in pre-
vious hearing).
80. See id. (allowing, pursuant to Pap's A.M., state to rely on evidentiary find-
ings of harmful secondary effects established in Renton).
81. Fantasy Ranch, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 2006)
(noting that Pap's A.M. was good starting point for determining level of scrutiny to
apply to challenged statute).
82. See Conchatta, Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 267 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007) (No. 06-844) (targeting secondary effects
sufficient for Third Circuit to apply O'Brien intermediate standard of review). For
a further discussion of Conchatta, see infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
83. See 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2006) (discuss-
ing application of narrowing construction). The 181 South court reasoned that
"[a] limiting construction may be found where a state court or enforcement
agency has opined as to how the statute should be interpreted." Id. at 234 (same).
84. See Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 263 (3d Cir. 2006) (determining whether nar-
rowing construction to state statute had been supplied by state courts or state en-
forcement agencies). The Third Circuit acknowledged the impact of a narrowing
construction, but cautioned that it would not "rewrite a state law to conform it to
constitutional requirements." Id. (contemplating effect of narrowing
construction).
85. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (holding that judi-
cially-created narrowing construction can save overly broad statutory language);
Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 263 (reasoning that court must "consider any limiting con-
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An implied narrowing construction relies on past administrative prac-
tice, such as enforcement tendencies, rather than on a state court holding
as a means of limiting the statute's breadth.8 6 Although the implied nar-
rowing construction is, in principle, a practical judicial solution to an
overly broad 'statutory term or phrase, circuit courts presented with the
argument have split on whether to accept the concept.8 7 The Third, Sixth
and some Eighth Circuit precedent have rejected implied narrowing con-
structions.8 8 Meanwhile, the Fifth and other Eighth Circuit precedent
have accepted administrative practice as a viable narrowing technique.89
The Sixth Circuit has expressly declined to accept an implied narrow-
ing construction when no judicially-created limitation was present.9 0 For
example, in Odle v. Decatur County,9 1 the County argued that the court
should uphold statutory language requiring "adult-oriented businesses" to
obtain licenses because there were no venues in the county wherein main-
stream performances were likely to occur; thus, it was impossible to en-
force the statute broadly.9 2 The court quickly dismissed the argument,
stating that "the fact that [the] County purportedly lacks, at the present
struction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered"); Giovani
Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 517 (4th Cir. 2002) (expressing willingness
to accept narrowing construction, but finding that no judicially-created narrowing
construction was readily available).
86. See Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 265 (noting that state proffered "past practice"
as impliedly narrowing breadth of statutory language); Odle v. Decatur County, 421
F.3d 386, 396 (6th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging implied narrowing construction ar-
gument, but declining to accept same); SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d
856, 865 (8th Cir. 2003) (allowing past practice to suffice as implied narrowing
construction).
87. Compare Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 265 (rejecting concept of implied narrow-
ing construction), Odle, 421 F.3d at 396 (holding administrative practice alone
does not create narrowing construction), and Ways v. City of Lincoln, 274 F.3d 514,
519-20 (8th Cir. 2001) (refusing to limit statute's reach in light of statute's exces-
sively large scope), with SOB, 317 F.3d at 864-65 (accepting implied narrowing con-
struction on basis of County Attorney's affidavit), and Baby Dolls Topless Saloons,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 295 F.3d 471, 483 (5th Cir. 2002) (allowing past and antici-
pated future administrative practice to satisfy narrowing construction
requirements).
88. See Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 265 (refusing to acknowledge narrowing con-
struction); Odle, 421 F.3d at 396 (holding administrative practice insufficient
means of limiting statute's reach); Ways, 274 F.3d at 519-20 (rejecting implied nar-
rowing construction).
89. See SOB, 317 F.3d at 864-65 (acknowledging implied narrowing construc-
tion); Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, 295 F.3d at 483 (adopting narrowing construction
based on administrative practice).
90. See Odle, 421 F.3d at 396 (analyzing implied narrowing construction argu-
ment). Specifically, the statute required "all operators of 'adult-oriented establish-
ments'. . . to obtain licenses from the Board." See id. at 388-89 (detailing
challenged statute).
91. 421 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2005).
92. See id. at 388-89 (reasoning that defendants wanted to avoid overbreadth
on ground that it was not reasonably likely for mainstream entertainment to occur
within geographical area covered by statute).
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time, venues likely to hold performances of literary or artistic value should
[not] affect our construction of the ordinance's plain language."93 The
Sixth Circuit continued its attack, reasoning that to adopt an implied nar-
rowing construction would be "in contrast to the great weight of the perti-
nent case law."94 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit refused to accept a
narrowing construction of statutory terms even though defendants posited
that the statute could have been interpreted to extend only to sexual
arousal and touching. 95 The Eighth Circuit held, on this occasion, that
the statutory language had "far greater range" than the defendants
envisioned. 96
Conversely, other Eighth Circuit panels and the Fifth Circuit have
been willing to accept administrative practice as a sufficient narrowing
construction. 9 7 In SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton,9 8 the Eighth Circuit
strayed from past case law while confronting an overly broad statute regu-
lating public indecency.99 The Eighth Circuit relied on two factors in de-
ciding to accept the current administrative practice as an implied
narrowing construction: (1) a sworn and uncontradicted affidavit by the
County Attorney attesting that there were no mainstream theaters in Ben-
ton that could potentially be affected by the overly broad language; and
(2) a stipulation that the County's prosecutorial intent was not, nor would
it be, aimed at mainstream entertainment establishments. 10 0 On this ba-
sis, the Eighth Circuit held that "the record does not support an inference
that protected theatrical activity is presently being chilled, or that the
93. Id. (stating reasons for rejecting implied narrowing construction argu-
ment). The court further explained that "[i] n cases where an ordinance or statute
survived review it was because an express exception in the law's text or other spe-
cific language made the law 'readily susceptible' to a limiting construction." Id. at
396.
94. Id. (criticizing defendant's case law support).
95. See Ways v. City of Lincoln, 274 F.3d 514, 519-20 (8th Cir. 2001) (arguing
for implied narrowing construction on ground that language would not reach
mainstream expression). The court reasoned that "[e]ven if the prohibitions were
interpreted to reach only conduct intending sexual arousal, the city's net was still
cast too broadly because constitutionally protected artistic expression may legiti-
mately intend to titillate or arouse members of the audience." Id. (describing po-
tential impact of statutory phrases).
96. See id. (stating holding).
97. See SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2003)
(accepting implied narrowing construction); Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 295 F.3d 471, 483 (5th Cir. 2002) (allowing administrative practice
to satisfy narrowing construction requirements).
98. 317 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2003).
99. See id. at 864 (determining whether ordinance had chilling effect on pro-
tected First Amendment speech).
100. See id. at 865 (describing statements made by County Attorney in affidavit
in support of inference that County Attorney's office would not pursue enforce-
ment of statute against mainstream entertainment).
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County will ever enforce the genital-fondling prohibition against the cast
of a theatrical production."' 0'
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit accepted the implied narrowing construc-
tion argument in Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. City of Dallas.'0 2 After
upholding the statute under the Renton analysis, the Fifth Circuit con-
ducted a facial overbreadth analysis, reviewing a statute that potentially
gave enforcement officials the power to declare mainstream entertain-
ment businesses as sexually oriented (thus subjecting them to additional
regulation). 10 3 Although no state court or administrative decision was
cited, the Fifth Circuit relied on the city's "established history of not classi-
fying mainstream businesses as [sexually oriented businesses]" as sufficient
evidence of administrative practice.' 0 4 As a result, the Fifth Circuit
adopted the narrowing construction and rejected the overbreadth
challenge. 1
0 5
III. ANALYsis
A. The Third Circuit Undresses the Issues in Conchatta and 181 South
Within a short period of time, the Third Circuit rendered two rulings
concerning the constitutionality of Pennsylvania and New Jersey statutes
forbidding lewd behavior in liquor-licensed clubs.' 0 6 The Third Circuit
first confronted the issue when a New Jersey regulation was challenged in
181 South. 107 An adult cabaret named Moulin Rouge challenged a New
Jersey statute prohibiting "lewd or immoral" activity in clubs with liquor
licenses.' 08 Moulin Rouge was afraid that its main attraction, "topless
dance performances that include sexually explicit dance routines," would
violate the statute, thus forcing the club to incur "substantial financial pen-
101. Id. (describing reasons for accepting implied narrowing construction).
102. See Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, 295 F.3d at 483 (relying on established his-
tory of enforcement when accepting narrowing construction).
103. See id. at 480-81 (discussing Renton analysis).
104. Id. at 483 (detailing reasons for accepting narrowing construction).
105. See id. (discussing holding).
106. See Conchatta, Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75
U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007) (No. 06-844) (filing opinion on August 15,
2006); 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2006) (filing opinion on
July 18, 2006).
107. See 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 230 (3d Cir. 2006) (granting
review to consider constitutional challenge to New Jersey statute forbidding lewd
behavior in liquor licensed clubs).
108. See id. (detailing facts and regulation language). Specifically, the regula-
tion proscribed "lewdness or immoral" activity in a licensed premises. See id. at
229-30 (stating statute's language). The appellant, 181 South, Inc., owned and op-
erated an "adult cabaret called Moulin Rouge" in Atlantic City, New Jersey. See id.
(noting facts).
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alties." 10 9 The Third Circuit initially applied the O'Brien analysis. 110 First,
the court found that regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages fell within
the realm of "police powers" granted to the states, thereby fulfilling the
first prong of the O'Brien test. 1 ' Second, the court was explicit in reason-
ing that the state's interest in curtailing immoral behavior was "important
and substantial."' 12 Third, the court found that the regulation was not a
complete bar on expression, "[r]ather, it only prohibit[ed] such activity
from taking place on the premises of liquor-licensed establishments."
1 1 3
Finally, the court held that the means set forth by the statute were tailored
appropriately to its goals. 1 14 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the
statute fulfilled the O'Brien test and did not, in nature, violate the First
Amendment. 11
5
Although the Third Circuit acknowledged that the O'Brien test was
satisfied, the court conducted a separate overbreadth analysis, impliedly
accepting petitioner's argument that the statute could be constitutional
under O'Brien, but unconstitutionally overbroad by its terms. 16 Although
109. Id. at 230 (discussing facts prompting 181 South, Inc. to file for declara-
tory and injunctive relief). The Alcoholic Beverage Control ("ABC") had cited 181
South, Inc. for three separate violations of ABC regulations. See id. (discussing
facts). The citations stemmed from an undercover investigation wherein the un-
dercover agent viewed a dancer "rubbing her breast and vagina while onstage." Id.
at 231 (same). The undercover agent also viewed similar acts conducted with the
participation of patrons, including a one-on-one dance. See id. (same).
110. See id. at 232-34 (declining to follow Court's holding in LaRue and apply-
ing O'Brien to facial overbreadth challenge). The Third Circuit acknowledged the
diminished precedential value of LaRue prior to embarking on the O'Brien analysis.
See id. at 233 (detailing Supreme Court guidance). For a further discussion of the
limited precedential value of LaRue, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
111. See id. at 234 (addressing first prong of O'Brien test relating to requisite
state power in enacting statute).
112. See id. (citing City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296-97 (2000) (plu-
rality opinion)) (couching state interest as "curtailing 'unacceptable social behav-
ior' that can arise in conjunction with adult entertainment").
113. Id. (detailing third prong of O'Brien analysis). "In other words, the Regu-
lation 'is not a restriction of erotic expression, but a prohibition of nonexpressive
conduct (i.e., serving and consuming alcohol)' on premises where such expression
takes place." Id. (quoting Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 726
(7th Cir. 2003)) (confronting statute similar to regulation in 181 South).
114. See id. (reasoning that "the Regulation's restriction on First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest").
115. See id. (acknowledging that court "[was] thus satisfied" that First Amend-
ment protection of freedom of expression was not violated under O'Brien analysis).
116. See id. at 234-35 (analyzing facial overbreadth challenge). The court
stated the plaintiffs burden to be the following: "[i]n order to show that a statute
is unconstitutionally overbroad, 181 South must show that the Regulation is not
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts and that its deter-
rent effect on legitimate expression is both real and substantial." Id. at 234 (inter-
nal quotations omitted). Although the Third Circuit treated the O'Brien analysis
and the overbreadth analysis separately, it would appear that O'Brien practically
incorporates facial overbreadth claims. Under the Third Circuit's analysis, if a stat-
ute's language is overbroad on its face (as opposed to its application), then a court
would likely find that (1) the legislature lacked the constitutional power to enact
[Vol. 52: p. 10951112
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the Third Circuit found the phrase "lewd or immoral activities" to be
somewhat overbroad, the court was quick to accept a judicially-created
narrowing construction of the phrase as stated by the NewJersey Superior
Court.1' 7 Previously, the NewJersey Superior Court limited the reach of
the statute to "entertainment where 'the predominant object and natural
effect upon the observers-patrons of one portion of the performance [is]
erotic excitation.'"' 18 The Third Circuit was satisfied that the judicially-
created limitation on the statute's reach was sufficient to ensure that main-
stream entertainment would not be subject to the statute's penalties.' 9
As a result, the Third Circuit upheld the New Jersey statute.' 20
Just a few months later, the Third Circuit confronted the same issue
surrounding the provisions and application of a Pennsylvania statute. 2 1
Conchatta originally reached the Third Circuit in 2002, when the plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction against a Pennsylvania statute banning
"lewd or immoral" behavior in premises licensed by the Liquor Control
Board.' 22 Although holding, in a per curiam opinion, that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, the Third Circuit acknowledged
that the plaintiffs had "made a strong case that the statute [was] over-
broad" on the merits.' 23
the statute (O'Brien's first prong) or (2) the reach of the overbroad language was
not supported by a substantial governmental interest (O'Brien's second prong).
For a further discussion of this issue, see infra note 131 and accompanying text.
117. See id. at 234-35 (accepting narrowing construction created by state
court).
118. Id. (discussing state court opinion). Not only did the state court decision
limit the reach of the statute to certain activities, it also offered guidance to en-
forcement officials investigating potential violations. See id. (determining scope of
narrowing construction). The state court held that "exposing breasts and bare
anal area to patrons constitutes a violation of the Regulation." Id. (citing G. &J.K
Enter. v. Div. of Alcohol Beverage Control, 500 A.2d 43, 46 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1985)) (limiting scope of liquor control statutory language).
119. See id. at 235 (reasoning that state court's narrowing construction "limits
[regulation's] reach mainly to entertainment similar to that shown at Moulin
Rouge").
120. See id. (upholding regulation's constitutionality). The Third Circuit also
rejected 181 South's contention that the Regulation was unconstitutionally vague.
See id. (rejecting 181 South's vagueness argument because "the conduct observed
on 181 South's premises clearly falls within the ambit of the conduct the Regula-
tion proscribes at liquor-licensed businesses").
121. See Conchatta Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 261 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007) (No. 06-844) (presenting challenge to Penn-
sylvania statute proscribing "lewd, immoral or improper entertainment" on li-
censed premises).
122. See Conchatta, Inc. v. Evanko, 83 Fed. App'x 437, 438-39 (3d Cir. 2003)
(per curiam) (non-precedential opinion) (seeking preliminary injunction against
Liquor Control Board). Conchatta, Inc. operates Club Risque, an adult entertain-
ment club, where the dancers "[are] clothed and then strip until they are wearing
only G-strings and latex covering over their nipples. They then circulate among
the patrons seeking tips." Id. (discussing facts).
123. See id. at 441 (discussing merits of plaintiffs' claims). The Third Circuit
reasoned that although the Supreme Court had authored a number of decisions
20071 1113
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When Conchatta reached the Third Circuit for the second time, the
plaintiffs successfully challenged the Pennsylvania statute. 124 Unlike 181
South, where the Third Circuit began its discussion with the applicability of
the O'Brien standard, the court in Conchatta began with a lengthy discus-
sion of narrowing constructions. 125 After analyzing past state court and
regulatory cases, the Third Circuit could not find ajudicially-created limi-
tation. 126 Moreover, the court declined to adopt the concept of an im-
plied narrowing construction.1 27  The Liquor Control Board
Commissioner argued that the court should construe the statutory lan-
guage narrowly because the statute was applied "only to live dancing in-
volving exposure of genitals or involving physical sexual contact between
patrons and dancers."1 28 Unlike other circuits willing to accept adminis-
trative practice as a narrowing construction, the Third Circuit expressly
rejected this concept, stating that "[p]ast practice does not constitute a
narrowing construction." 129 After declaring the implied construction ar-
gument unconvincing, the Third Circuit focused on the language of the
statute, finding that it potentially applied to "'plays, musicals, concerts,
political satires, comedies ... and art shows."13
0
concerning erotic dancing, the "central language in the Pennsylvania statute [had]
not been revamped in more than a half-century." Id. (noting statutory language).
Still, however, the Third Circuit avoided answering the question on the merits be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm caused by the denial of a mo-
tion for preliminary injunction. See id. (stating reason for denying preliminary
injunction).
124. See Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 267 (holding that challenged provisions of
Pennsylvania liquor statute were overly broad).
125. See id. at 263 (listing "Availability of a Limiting Construction" as first
heading under "Overbreadth" section). An overbreadth challenge seeks to answer
whether "a law punishes a substantial amount of protected free speech, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep .... " See id. at 262-63 (internal
quotations omitted) (discussing appropriate standard of review).
126. See id. at 263-64 (searching for and failing to find narrowing construction
in Pennsylvania's past state court and regulatory actions). Although the Third Cir-
cuit found that the statute had been challenged a number of times in state court,
the court was not convinced that any of the state court decisions actually narrowed
the potential reach of the statute. See id. (searching for narrowing construction).
Rather, past cases simply discussed the history of the statute's enforcement. See id.
(detailing history of same).
127. See id. at 265 (rejecting implicit narrowing construction posited by re-
spondent). The Commissioner argued that "an implicit narrowing construction
has emerged." Id. The Third Circuit cited to a number of circuits where the idea
of an implied narrowing construction was rejected. See id. (rejecting implied nar-
rowing construction argument).
128. Id. (stating respondent's argument for implied narrowing construction
of Pennsylvania statute provision).
129. Id. (declining to adopt limiting construction argument). For further dis-
cussion of other circuit courts' approaches to the concept of an implied narrowing
construction, see supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
130. Id. at 266 (citing Conchatta, Inc. v. Evanko, 83 Fed. App'x 437, 444 (3d
Cir. 2003)) (discussing impact on mainstream entertainment).
[Vol. 52: p. 10951114
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The Third Circuit embarked on the O'Brien analysis only after it
found the statutory provision to be overly inclusive.' 3 1 The court con-
cluded that the challenged provisions failed the O'Brien test because the
government interest in regulating the strip clubs did not apply to other
mainstream entertainment that was nonetheless covered by the reach of
the statute.13 2 The Third Circuit emphasized the lack of evidence sup-
porting a link between the statute's purpose of combating harmful secon-
dary effects and regulating mainstream performances or concerts,
reasoning that "[w]ithout evidence of such a connection, there is no state
interest to justify a substantial fraction of the Challenged Provisions'
scope."'133 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the challenged provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania statute were unconstitutional., 34
B. Stripping Away Confusion: Guidance for Practitioners and State Legislators
As strip clubs begin to challenge state regulations with increasing fre-
quency, practitioners and legislators must develop new drafting nuances
and legal arguments that can withstand Third Circuit scrutiny.1 35 Practi-
tioners should focus their arguments on the existence of secondary effects
and the availability of a narrowing construction.' 3 6 Meanwhile, legislators
131. See id. at 267-68 (discussing secondary effects standard and content-neu-
tral nature of statute). After citing to the four-prong O'Brien test, the Third Circuit
quickly found the fourth prong violated because the statute burdened non-
targeted establishments. See id. at 267 (announcing holding). This is an example
of how overly broad language, generally a separate constitutional concern, is prac-
tically incorporated into the O'Brien analysis.
132. See id. at 267-68 (stating reasons for holding).
With respect to nude or topless dancing at clubs or bars, an interest in
limiting harmful secondary effects may justify the Challenged Provi-
sions .... With respect to ordinary theater and ballet performances, con-
certs, and other similar forms of entertainment, however, the
Commissioner provides no evidence that the Challenged Provisions pre-
vent harmful secondary effects.
Id. (emphasis added) (discussing reason that challenged provisions violated First
Amendment).
133. See id. at 268. (detailing evidence required to prove that state interest is
served by current tailoring of language).
134. See id. (stating holding). Because the challenged provisions "punish [ed]
a 'substantial' amount of protected free speech," the Third Circuit held the statute
to be overly broad. Id. (discussing holding).
135. See generally Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Fox, 470 F.3d 1074 (4th Cir. 2006)
(releasing decision December 15, 2006); Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 258 (deciding case
in late 2006); Andy's Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v. City of Gary, 466 F.3d 550 (7th Cir.
2006) (releasing decision in late 2006); 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228 (3d
Cir. 2006) (announcing decision just one month prior to Conchatta decision).
136. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289-91 (2000) (plurality opin-
ion) (applying O'Brien test, but injecting discussion of secondary effects into plural-
ity opinion); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-54 (1986)
(resting holding on secondary effects analysis); Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 267 (discuss-
ing secondary effects doctrine); SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 864-
65 (8th Cir. 2003) (accepting implied narrowing construction argument); Baby
Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 295 F.3d 471, 483 (5th Cir. 2002)
2007] 1115
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should expressly limit the expansive language of regulatory statutes and
add an "exception clause" to prevent enforcement officials from regulat-
ing mainstream entertainment facilities.1 37
1. Constitutional Challenges: Advice for Attorneys
When challenging or defending the constitutionality of a statute regu-
lating a strip club, practitioners should first obtain a favorable standard of
review-either intermediate scrutiny if trying to uphold the statute or
strict scrutiny if attempting to have the statute declared unconstitu-
tional. 138 As referenced, statutes regulating the sex-based industry are
generally considered content-neutral (either aimed at secondary effects or
couched as a zoning regulation), thereby subjecting the statutes to inter-
mediate scrutiny under O'Brien, Renton or some combination thereof.1 39
Consistent with the majority of other circuits, the Third Circuit has oper-
ated under O'Brien while also emphasizing the secondary effects analysis
presented in Renton.140 Nevertheless, practitioners challenging the stat-
utes should argue that the statutes are pretextual and aimed solely at sup-
pressing expression in the hopes of obtaining a strict scrutiny review. 1 4 1
Conversely, when attempting to overcome challenges, practitioners should
(applying implied narrowing construction). For a further discussion of the impor-
tance of secondary effects to the standard of review, see supra notes 35-39, 56 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the impact of narrowing construc-
tions when construing overly broad statutory language, see supra notes 83-89 and
accompanying text.
137. Compare Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 515-18 (4th Cir.
2002) (striking down statute as overly broad for failing to narrowly tailor language
and failing to include exception clause), with Giovani Carandola, 470 F.3d at 1084
(upholding constitutionality of same statute after language was limited in scope
and exception clause was included).
138. See Wright, supra note 28, at 334, 349-51 (explaining impact of standard
of review and how to determine same under content-based versus content-neutral
distinction). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis when decid-
ing whether to lower the standard of review in the First Amendment context, see
supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
139. See Adler, supra note 3, at 1118-22 (explaining current constitutional
standards for regulatory statutes indirectly implicating First Amendment). For a
further discussion of the O'Brien and Renton standards of review, see supra notes 33-
52 and accompanying text.
140. See Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 267 (applying O'Brien with emphasis on secon-
dary effects doctrine); 181 South, 454 F.3d at 234 (using secondary effects doctrine
to satisfy fourth prong of O'Brien analysis).
141. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 447 (2002)(plurality opinion) (finding that law at issue was not suspect and, therefore, not
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of inference that it was covertly attacking
speech); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion)
("To determine what level of scrutiny applies to the ordinance at issue here, we
must decide 'whether the State's regulation is related to the suppression of expres-
sion."') (citation omitted).
1116 [Vol. 52: p. 1095
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justify the statute's constitutionality with evidence of secondary effects,
thus subjecting it to a reduced standard of review.142
Even if the secondary effects are real and substantial, the Third Cir-
cuit, in both Conchatta and 181 South, has emphasized the importance of
narrowly defining the scope of challenged provisions.' 4 3 Depending on
the nature of the provision, practitioners may need to supply proof of a
narrowing construction.144 The Third Circuit has been somewhat contra-
dictory when addressing narrowing constructions. 45 As eager as the
Third Circuit was to accept a twenty-year-old state court construction in
181 South, it was just as eager to reject the concept of an implied narrow-
ing construction in Conchatta.146 When arguing to uphold statutory lan-
guage, practitioners should first look for a judicially-created narrowing
construction. 147 If unavailable, Third Circuit practitioners should be pre-
pared to present evidence of past administrative practice in the hopes that
the Third Circuit will recognize the practicality of the implied narrowing
construction. 1 48 When challenging a statute, practitioners should dis-
credit any judicially-created construction and rely on the Third Circuit's
current stance on implied constructions.
149
2. Dodging a Lawsuit: Advice for Legislators
To avoid the Third Circuit's recent concerns over the reach of statu-
tory language, legislators should carefully limit the scope of a statute by
142. See Alameda, 535 U.S. at 438 (reasoning that "[the Court] specifically re-
fused to set such a high bar for municipalities that want to address merely the
secondary effects of protected speech"); Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (declaring that
regulations that are unrelated to suppression of expression are disposed of under
intermediate scrutiny standards set forth in O'Brien).
143. Compare Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 263-64 (beginning discussion with analysis
of available narrowing constructions), with 181 South, 454 F.3d at 234-35 (conclud-
ing discussion with analysis and eventual acceptance of narrowing construction).
144. See Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 263-64 (holding that secondary effects were
legitimate in some, but not all, of entertainment industries affected by challenged
statute, leading Third Circuit in search of narrowing construction).
145. For a further discussion of Third Circuit inconsistency, see infra note 146
and accompanying text.
146. Compare Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 263-65 (refusing to accept narrowing con-
struction and refusing to imply the same), with 181 South, 454 F.3d at 234-35 (ap-
plying narrowing construction from New Jersey state court to save statute).
147. For a further discussion of why federal courts prefer judicially-created
narrowing constructions, see supra notes 85, 87 and accompanying text.
148. See SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 865 (8th Cir. 2003)
(relying on affidavit as implied construction of statute); Baby Dolls Topless Sa-
loons, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 295 F.3d 471, 483 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing to evidence of
past administrative practice in upholding statute).
149. See Conchatta, 458 F.3d at 263-65 (declining to accept implied narrowing
construction based on past administrative practice). "Although Pennsylvania
courts and agencies have addressed the Statute . . .on numerous occasions, no
clear narrowing construction of the Challenged Provisions has emerged." Id. at
263 (discussing state court cases interpreting challenged provisions).
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implementing three drafting nuances. 150 First, in the statute's preamble,
legislators should clearly justify the statute as "combating the secondary
effects" of strip clubs. 1 5 1 This drafting nuance will remove any ambiguity
surrounding the statute's justifications, and will likely result in the Third
Circuit adopting intermediate scrutiny when reviewing challenged provi-
sions. 15 2 Second, to supplement provisions prohibiting "lewd or immoral"
activity, legislators should include a limiting provision, setting forth an il-
lustrative list of actions considered lewd or immoral.1 53 Such a provision
will narrow the scope of the statute and likely alleviate some of the Third
Circuit's recent First Amendment concerns. 154 Finally, legislators should
include an "exception" clause that explicitly removes the power of en-
forcement agencies to regulate "persons operating theaters, concert halls,
art centers" and other mainstream entertainment facilities.' 5 5 By includ-
ing the exception provision, legislators could textually cure overregulation
anxieties. 1 56 By applying these three statutory drafting suggestions, Third
Circuit legislators can avoid (or at least overcome) overbreadth
challenges. 157
IV. NOTHING GoOD EVER HAPPENS AFTER Two A.M.
The recent Third Circuit opinions reflect the uncertainty surround-
ing the constitutionality of current state regulations targeting strip
clubs.' 58 As a national debate continues over whether exotic dance
150. See Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Fox, 470 F.3d 1074, at 1081-83 (detailing
amendments made to statute that was previously held to be unconstitutional); see
also Tucker, supra note 8, at 402 (describing drafting and evidentiary advice for
legislators crafting statutory language to regulate sex-based industries). For a fur-
ther discussion of the three drafting nuances, see infra notes 151-56 and accompa-
nying text.
151. See Carandola, 470 F.3d at 1081-82 (citing to preamble of amended stat-
ute when addressing justifications for statute).
152. For further discussion of the importance of intermediate scrutiny, see
supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
153. See Carandola, 470 F.3d at 1083 (describing new statutory language that
specifically proscribed behavior, including "fondling" and "simulated sexual acts").
154. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's concerns in relation to
mainstream expression, see supra note 130, 132-34 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Carandola, 470 F.3d at 1084 (discussing impact of exception
clause and upholding statute partially based on its adoption); Odle v. Decatur
County, 421 F.3d 386, 396-97 (6th Cir. 2005) (reminding litigants that statutes in
this context survive because of exception clause or another limiting feature in lan-
guage); Farkas v. Miller, 151 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that "the stat-
ute's exception . . . saves it from being overbroad").
156. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's recent overbreadth con-
cerns regarding the New Jersey and Pennsylvania statutes, see supra notes 116-20,
125-30, 133-34 and accompanying text.
157. For a further discussion of the potential impact of these drafting tech-
niques, see supra notes 137, 155 and accompanying text.
158. See Adler, supra note 3, at 1122-23 (" [C]ritics have attacked the Court's
expansion of the secondary effects doctrine in Pap's; the questionable legitimacy of
morality as a justification for banning speech in Bames; the Court's tortured and
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should be afforded more constitutional protection, Third Circuit practi-
tioners and legislators are left with the unsavory task of grappling with a
transient and politicized constitutional issue.159 It is likely that, after scan-
ning the current legal landscape, the Supreme Court will soon step in to
cure the confusion.' 60 Until such time, however, divergent political views
coupled with an unstable Supreme Court stance will provide ammunition
and emotion to this current First Amendment debate. 61 Underneath the
political and social debate, states are struggling to retain regulatory power,
while individuals are fighting for enhanced constitutional protection. 1
62
If recent Third Circuit cases are any indication of the future outcome, the
battle is far from over.
163
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fractured opinions in Barnes, and the attempt in both cases to categorize the regu-
lations as content-neutral."); Shafer & Adams, supra note 16, at 23 ("Further com-
plicating these matters is the fact that subsequent to the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Pap's, the Court revisited the secondary effects doctrine in . . .Ala-
meda[.] "); see also Alan R. Levy, Lewdness Divides Along Delaware River: Third Circuit
Decides Pennsylvania, New Jersey Topless-Bar Cases Differently, N.J. L.J., Oct. 9, 2006, at
43 (discussing recent Third Circuit cases that resulted in divergent holdings). For
a further discussion of the confusion currently afflicting circuit courts, see supra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
159. See Cato, supra note 17, at 1 ("Freedom of expression in Pennsylvania
now includes a lap dance and a drink."); Duffy, supra note 5, at 15 (detailing Third
Circuit's holding in 181 South); Luke E. Saladin, Strip Clubs Plan to Appeal Ruling,
Ky. PosT, Oct. 4, 2006, at Al (discussing recent district court decision that upheld
ordinance regulating strip clubs).
160. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Miller v. Conchatta, Inc., No. 06-844
(Dec. 14, 2006), 2006 WL 3740634 (U.S. filed Dec. 14, 2006) (petitioning for re-
view of Third Circuit's decision in Conchatta in light of circuit confusion over which
standards to apply when assessing constitutionality of regulations targeting adult
entertainment facilities and venues). For a discussion of the confusion that may
prompt the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Conchatta, see supra notes 66-68,
87-89 and accompanying text.
161. See Baradaran-Robison, supra note 56, at 447 (stating that "[z]oning of
strip clubs, adult video stores, and other adult entertainment businesses is a fre-
quent source of controversy and litigation in many American cities"); see also Adler,
supra note 3, at 1124-25 (arguing that sexual expression through nude dance is not
as harmful as some may perceive). Adler argues that the protections of the G-
string (and other similar protections) are illusory. See id. at 1127-28 (stating that G-
string does not provide much practical protection anyway).
162. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 3, at 289 (noting that states are in-
creasing use of their regulatory power by regulating more often as nude dancing
becomes more popular); see also Adler, supra note 3, at 1127 (attacking court's
reasoning, arguing that "the Court's analysis unwittingly replicates a deeper cul-
tural trope in which the nude woman's body stands for danger, debasement,
crime, violence, [and] disease. . . ."). See generally Mills Eckert, supra note 26, at
242-50 (discussing state regulatory schemes and Court's responses thereto).
163. See Conchatta Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007) (No. 06-844) (striking state statutory
language); 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2006) (uphold-
ing state statute); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Miller v. Conchatta, Inc.,
No. 06-844 (Dec. 14, 2007), 2006 WL 3740634 (detailing vast amount of confusion
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currently facing circuit courts). See generally Calvert & Richards, supra note 3, at
288-89 ("Whether targeting the location of sexually oriented businesses or restrict-
ing what goes on inside them, large cities, small towns, and scattered counties
throughout the United States are stepping up efforts to regulate the purveyors of
adult entertainment.").
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